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COMMENTS
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO A JUDICIAL DILEMMA: THE
PENNSYLVANIA HOME IMPROVEMENT FINANCE ACT
I.
INTRODUCTION
The area of home modernization financing has presented numerous
problems whose solutions have sometimes resulted in legal distortions.
Courts have been faced with a demand for consumer protection on the
one side and, on the other side, a corresponding demand for the free flow
of commercial paper. Often, a strict and rigid adherence to one plea or
the other has resulted in manifest injustice. Consider the following situa-
tion: A salesman after convincing two homeowners that they were desper-
ately in need of new storm windows, induced them to execute a contract
and accompanying judgment note (in blank) which was immediately com-
pleted and negotiated to a bank. Installation of the windows began shortly
thereafter but the work was improperly done and the windows, as installed,
did not conform to the contract. When the customers were later notified
that payment was to be made to the bank, they complained that the windows
were not as specified and refused to make the monthly payments when due.
The bank immediately entered judgment upon the note.'
This situation was not at all unusual, but judicial resolution was
reluctant despite instances of the victimization of installment buyers with
limited financial resources by unscrupulous salesmen. Although courts did
not stand by completely idle,2 there was a general desire for legislative
reform. Newspaper exposes5 of unscrupulous, fly-by-night operators and
complaints of constituents to their legislators, together with the tarnished
"public image" of leading financial institutions all contributed somewhat to
the ultimate passage of the much needed statute. "The bank which is the
holder of an installment contract where one of the parties falls into either
of these categories [a homeowner who is unduly particular or a profit-
seeking contractor who is inclined to cut corners] unavoidably suffers
criticism. '" 4 Obviously, a large lending institution must maintain favorable
1. A petition to open the judgment was discharged upon the successful assertion
by the bank that it was a holder in due course. First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 7 Pa.
D.&C.2d 661 (C.P. Bucks County 1956).
2. See Part II, infra.
3. E.g., Philadelphia Daily News, March 26, 1962, p. 22, col. 1.
4. Address by Anthony G. Felix, Jr., Esquire, Senior Vice-President and Secre-
tary of The First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Company, before Pennsylvania
Bankers Association, November 21, 1963.
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relations with its numerous customers and this was not an unimportant
factor in launching the statute.
An examination of the situation in many jurisdictions not having
similar statutes reveals many flaws in consumer protection as well as
burdens placed upon financial institutions by judicial attempts at reaching
equitable decisions.
II.
HOME IMPROVEMENT FINANCING PRIOR To THE STATUTE
A. Generally
The common practice in financing sales, not only of home improve-
ments, but also appliances, furniture, indeed almost all consumer goods,
was the utilization of a conditional sale contract together with a negotiable
note executed by the buyer and payable to the seller which would subse-
quently be transferred to the financing agency or bank, usually as part of
a pre-arranged financing plan between the latter two parties. Often the
contract and the note each formed a part of the same piece of paper,
separated only by a perforated line. In the event of subsequent litigation,
the transferee would claim the position of a holder in due course. 5 This
arrangement proved to be unsatisfactory both to consumer and financer.
B. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law there was some doubt that the
negotiability of a note was not affected because it was executed in connec-
tion with a conditional sales contract.6 Generally, it may be said that such
paper satisfied the requirement that it be a "courier without luggage."
The problems arose when the courts had to determine whether the
financing agency was a holder in due course.8 In efforts to protect the con-
5. See generally Consumer Credit Symposium: Developments in the Law, part VI,
Finance Companies and Banks as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Installment
Credit Paper, 55 Nw. U.L. Rv. 389 (1960). For an extensive discussion of the entire
area, see 44 A.L.R.2d 8 (1955).
6. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal, App. 2d
766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950). In some states, a note executed concurrently with a con-
ditional sales contract was determined to be nonnegotiable: Von Nordheim v. Cornelius,
129 Neb. 719, 262 N.W. 832 (1935) ; Federal Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Zelkor Dining
Car Corp., 238 App. Div. 379, 264 N.Y.S. 723 (1933) ; Todd v. State Bank, 182 Iowa
276, 165 N.W. 593 (1917). The opposite result was reached in Thal v. Credit Alliance
Corp., 78 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1935); B.A.C. Corporation v. Cirucci, 131 N.J.L. 93,
35 A.2d 36 (1944) ; Motor Finance Corp. v. Huntsberger, 116 Ohio St. 317, 156
N.E. 111 (1927).
Under Section 3 of the N.I.L., a promise to pay is unconditional [required for
negotiability] within the meaning of the act, even though it is coupled with "(2) a
statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument."
7. Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346, 347 (1846).
8. UNIvORm NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 52:
A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the
following conditions:
(1) That it is complete and regular upon its face;
(2) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue and without
notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;
(3) That he took it in good faith and for value;
(4) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any
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sumer, the decisions have engrafted numerous exceptions upon the doctrine
of holder in due course, some of which have completely distorted its
original meaning.
The first of these exceptions revolves around a finding of an agency
relationship between the seller and the finance company. If such a relation-
ship is found, the financer does not take the instrument without notice and
consequently cannot be a holder in due course. In a case where the indorsee
was found to be an interested part), in the business of the indorser so that
he was only a medium through which the indorser sought to avoid liability
for the errors of its salesmen, judgment was given to the defendant buyer.
9
A related theory, and, from the number of decisions, a more popular
one with the judiciary, is to find the financer so closely related to the initial
transaction as to become a party to it and thus subject to any defenses the
maker might have to the instrument.
In an action in replevin brought by the financer against the purchaser
of an automobile, judgment for the defendant was affirmed on the basis that
the plaintiff, who prepared the instrument and took the assignment on the
same day as the sale, which assignment was placed on the instrument even
before it was executed, was for all purposes a party to the agreement and
instrument from the beginning with a duty to inquire into the adequacy of
the consideration. l0 In finding that a finance company which had investi-
gated the maker's credit, furnished the note and agreement containing its
name and approved the terms of the note and agreement was actually a
party to the transaction, the Florida Supreme Court said: "We think the
buyer - Mr. & Mrs. General Public - should have some protection some-
where along the line. We believe the finance company is better able to bear
the risk of the dealer's insolvency than the buyer and in a far better position
to protect his interests against unscrupulous and insolvent dealers.""1 A
somewhat more forceful statement appeared in a Buffalo City Court decision
on similar facts:
It is obvious that here we have a factual joint enterprise in which, so
far as conditional sales are concerned, the management rests in the
far larger part in the hands of the finance companies. The finance
company and the merchant-seller are as a fact engaged in one business,
like Longfellow's description of man and woman, useless one without
the other. To pretend that they are separate and distinct enterprises is
to draw the veil of fiction over the face of fact.1
2
9. McCurdy v. Stevens, 30 Ohio App. 545, 165 N.E. 855 (1928). See also
Sisemore & Kierbow Co., Inc. v. Nicholas, 149 Pa. Super. 376, 27 A.2d 473 (1942) ;
Titone v. General Electric Credit Corp., 108 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1951). But see
Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. West, 108 Kan. 875, 196 Pac. 1061 (1921) ; Standard
Motors Finance Co. v. Yellow Bayou Gin & Planting Co., 1 La. App. 424 (1925).
10. Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940), noted
in 53 HARV. L. Rsv. 1200 (1940). See Annot., 128 A.L.R. 726 (1940). The same
result was reached in a similar fact situation in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange
County Machine Works, 34 Cal. App. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950), noted in 25
NOTR DAMn LAW. 358 (1950) and 23 So. CAL. L. Riv. 580 (1950).
11. Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953).
12. Buffalo Industrial Bank v. DeMarzio, 162 Misc. 742, 744, 296 N.Y.S. 783, 785,
786 (Buffalo City Ct. 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
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Likewise, courts have found the indorsee to be in fact a party to the trans-
action where, in providing the forms for the underlying transaction, there
has been a completion certificate required as a prerequisite to financing
3
or a clause by which the buyer agrees to assert all claims against the seller
alone and waives any and all defenses he might have against the financer.
14
The latter promise, commonly known as a "cut-off clause", was held to be
void as an attempt to make a nonnegotiable instrument negotiable by
contract.'3
In attempting to analyze cases of this type, one author has commented:
One reason, surely, is that the whole transaction as it is normally
carried on is a sham. The transaction is really a loan by the financer
to the buyer to enable him to buy a chattel from the seller. However,
the papers are arranged in such a way that the loan is stated to be
from seller to buyer, and the resulting debt is then said to be transferred
to the financer. The transaction is not, in other words, what it appears
to be. Whenever this is the case, there is always the possibility that
a court can be talked into "piercing the veil", looking "through form
to substance", etc. 16
Another method occasionally utilized by courts who look kindly upon
the consumer is that of the "single instrument", whereby the note and the
contract are taken together, subject to defenses. Although knowledge of
the existence of an executory contract is generally considered to be merely
the suggestion of a potential equity which does not rise to the level of
notice,17 occasionally the "single instrument" theory will be invoked and
the holder will be treated as an assignee.'3
One final method of relieving the consumer from his plight, which
practice is prevalent in Pennsylvania, is the petition to open a judgment
entered by confession. This has been held to be an equitable proceeding 0
or one in the nature of an equitable proceeding20 and in either case is
13. Allied Bldg. Credits, Inc. v. Ellis, 258 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
14. Public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Fernandez, 121 N.Y.S.2d 721 (New York
Munic. Ct. 1952).
15. American Nat'l Bank v. Sommerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923).
... an attempt to deprive an obligor of his contract defenses was in essence an
attempt to create a negotiable instrument outside the framework of the NIL, and that
the NIL was mandatory and all-inclusive and could not be circumvented by agreement.
The waiver clause was void as against public policy." Gilmore, The Commercial
Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1096 (1954).
16. Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 1958
WASH. U.L.Q. 177, 183.
17. BRITON, BILLS AND NOTES, § 108 and cases cited therein (2d ed. 1961).
18. State Nat'l Bank v. Cantrell, 47 N.M. 389, 143 P.2d 592 (1943) ; Von Nordheim
v. Cornelius, 129 Neb. 719, 262 N.W. 832 (1935); Federal Credit Bureau, Inc. v.
Zelkor Dining Car Corp., 238 App. Div. 379, 264 N.Y.S. 723 (1933). The latter case
was criticized as being out of line with other authorities in New York and was not
followed in United States v. Novsam Realty Corp., 125 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1942). See
also Todd v. State Bank, 182 Iowa 276, 165 N.W. 593 (1917).
19. Stoner v. Sley System Garages, 353 Pa. 532, 46 A.2d 172 (1946); Perfect
Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Mandel, 345 Pa. 616, 29 A.2d 484 (1943); Mutual Bldg.
and Loan Ass'n v. Walukiewicz, 322 Pa. 240, 185 Atl. 648 (1936).
20. Smith v. Dale, 405 Pa. 293, 175 A.2d 78 (1961) ; Morrisville Shopping Center,
Inc. v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 381 Pa. 576, 112 A.2d 183 (1955).
[VOL. 10
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addressed to the sound discretion of the court, requiring a clear or manifest
abuse of discretion for reversal. Thus, in Ehnes v. Mang,2 1 an order open-
ing a confessed judgment upon the finding that the plaintiff was not a
holder in due course of the judgment note was affirmed on the basis that
there was no abuse of discretion.
Thus the courts, presumably out of pity for the consumer, have gradu-
ally weakened and eroded the position of finance companies which have
made possible the mass distribution of consumer goods. But this has been
the interpretation the courts have applied so that
[I]t is hard, and it becomes each year harder, for counsel to explain
convincingly why "the law" requires that a hard-pressed wage-earner
who has been bilked by a now-insolvent seller into buying junk
masquerading as a television set or a washing machine must pay the
full price to a bank or finance company whose own relationship with
the fraudulent seller has been intimate, long-continued and profitable.
The finance company must win "on the law" if it is to win at all.
2
2
At least one court, in determining the position of the indorsee of an
instrument given in payment for goods received, chose to follow the law
as written instead of judicial distortion:
The basis of those decisions is a feeling by the judiciary that, by using
the Negotiable Instruments Law as a shield, the finance company is
given an unfair advantage over the consumer buyer. There is un-
doubtedly some justification for this view, but steps to equalize their
positions and regulate installment credit sales should be taken by the
Legislature, and not by this court in view of the clear provisions of
the Negotiable Instruments Law.
23
C. Uniform Commercial Code
With the advent of the Code, the rights of the financer were more
clearly stated in the statute itself,24 but the practical problem remained.
21. 170 Pa. Super. 155, 84 A.2d 518 (1951).
22. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J.
1057, 1098 (1954).
23. White System of New Orleans, Inc. v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 450, 53 So. 2d 227,
230 (1951). The decisions referred to by the court were those which refuse to recog-
nize that finance companies may be holders in due course in installment credit sales.
24. UNIrFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302: (1) A holder in due course is a holder
who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any
defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-304: (4) Knowledge of the following facts does not
of itself give the purchaser notice of a defense or claim
(b) that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory promise
or accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the purchaser has
notice that a defense or claim has arisen from the terms thereof.
For a general comparison of the provisions of the NIL and the Code, see the following
series of articles: Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability - The Negotiable
Instruments Law Compared with the Proposed Commercial Code, 26 ROCKY MT. L.
Rev. 1 (1953) ; Britton, Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law and Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 TEXAs L. Rev. 153
COMMENTS
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Thus, mere knowledge that the note had been given in payment for the
sale and installation of a communications system which later proved defec-
tive did not defeat the plaintiff's position as a holder in due course in
Howard v. Biggs25 since there was no affirmative showing that he had
actual knowledge of the breach when he acquired the note. The indorsee's
rights were not defeated by failure of the payee's consideration even though
the indorsee supplied the printed form of the sales contract with detachable
note,26 and even though the indorsee took the note under circumstances
which ought to excite the suspicion of a prudent man but which were
short of actual knowledge of any defects in the subject matter of the under-
lying contract.2 1 The clear and unequivocal language of the Code together
with the paucity of decisions applying it seem to indicate that the position
of the financer is stronger in all but the most extreme position.2 8  Thus
where the makers of a note were persuaded to enter a "referral plan
' 20
which would realize sufficient money to send their daughter to college, and
the payees later disappeared, the indorsee was not found to be a holder in
due course since the transaction was one "reeking with malodorous fraud."30
It is easy to see that this situation was not satisfactory to either the
consumer or the financing agency. Courts were faced with the problem
of either following the law, which, in most cases would result in a decision
for the holder, or looking to the equities which often favored the consumer.
In any event, a variety of factors clearly indicated the need for reform in
the area. Among these, an increasing number of consumer complaints to
the Better Business Bureau, the local District Attorney, the Department
of Banking, state legislators, together with an ever increasing volume of
petitions to open judgments or complaints in equity to invalidate judg-
ments as well as newspaper editorials and an increasing awareness by
leading financial institutions that their public image was becoming tarnished,
combined to produce the new statute.
31
(1954) ; Britton, Holder in Due Course - A Comparison of the Provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law with Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial
Code, 49 Nw. U.L. RiEv. 417 (1954) ; Britton, Defenses, Claims of Ownership and
Equities - A Comparison of the Provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law
with Corresponding Provisions of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 7
HASTINGs L.J. 1 (1955).
25. 378 P.2d 306 (Okla. 1962).
26. Park Nat'l Bank v. Motyl, 13 Mass. App. Dec. 67 (1957).
27. Atlas Credit Corp. v. Breslin, 58 Sch. L.R. 104 (C.P. Schuylkill County 1959)
First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 7 Pa. D.&C.2d 661 (C.P. Bucks County 1955).
28. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAI CODE § 3-305.
29. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 10, 1963, pg. 1, col. 1.
30. Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115
(1963). See also Mills v. World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 59, 195
A.2d 118 (1963) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gardiner, 191 Pa. Super. 17, 155 A.2d 405
(1959) (where note and completion certificate were fraudulently obtained).
31. In a personal interview on November 2, 1964, with Mr. Rudolph A. Biborosch,
Vice-President of The First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Company and a mem-
ber of the committee which drafted the Home Improvement Finance Act, Mr.
Biborosch stated that there was a definite need for legislation to protect the con-
sumer from the tactics of fly-by-night operators whose actions constituted "flagrant
violations of business ethics" and were also succeeding in placing financing agencies
in a detrimental position in the eyes of their customers.
[VOL. 10
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STATUTORY REFORM - THE HOME IMPROVEMENT FINANCE AcT
A. Scope
In response to the need for balancing the various equities of a con-
sumer who has a legitimate complaint, the honest contractor who is dealing
with an unreasonable customer, and the financing agency who has acquired
the paper for value, in good faith and without knowledge of the complaint,
the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Home Improvement Finance Act,
which became effective on January 1, 1964.32 Previously, in 1947, the
Pennsylvania legislature passed the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act,
applicable to retail sales of motor vehicles, 33 whose requirements protected
the buyer and made him more fully aware of his rights and obligations
under the contract. Now legislative protection has been extended into
another area.
At the outset, it should be noted that, unlike a similar New York
statute which applies to the sales of all chattels with the exception of motor
vehicles, 34 the Home Improvement Finance Act covers the sale of goods
and furnishing of services pursuant to a home improvement installment
contract for the modernization, rehabilitation, repair, alteration or improve-
ment of real property. Excluded from coverage are contracts for the con-
struction of new homes; contracts for the sale of goods for purposes of
improving real property in which the cash price is less than three hundred
dollars ($300.00) ; contracts which do not provide for payment of a time
sale price, including, by definition, a finance charge, in installments: con-
tracts covering only an appliance designed to be freestanding, such as a
stove, freezer, refrigerator, or air conditioner and not built into and per-
manently affixed as an integral part of the structure, such as an air condi-
tioner connected with a central heating system; contracts to improve real
property used for commercial or business purposes; and a two party loan
arrangement, by which a bank makes a personal loan to a customer who
plans to use the proceeds to pay for an improvement to his home.35
The remainder of this comment will be devoted to an examination of
selected sections of the act together with a comparison with similar statutes
enacted in other jurisdictions.
B. Mandatory and Prohibited Contract Terms
Among the mandatory contract terms are a statement of the con-
tractor's name, place of business, identification of the property to be im-
proved, a description of the goods and services to be furnished, the cash
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 500-101-602 (Supp. 1964).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-637 (Supp. 1958). See generally 4 VILL. L.
Rev. 408 (1959).
34. N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 401-19 (McKinney 1962).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-102 (7), (9), (10), (11), (16) (Supp. 1964).
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price less down payment, and a statement of the amount of the finance charge
expressed in dollars. The words "Home Improvement Installment Con-
tract" must appear, in at least 10 point bold type, either at the top of the
contract or directly above the line provided for the signature, together with
a notice to the buyer, in at least 8 point bold type in the following language:
Notice to buyer: (1) Do not sign this contract before you read it.
(2) You are entitled to a completely filled in copy of this contract.
(3) Under the law, you have the right to pay off in advance the full
amount due and, under certain conditions, to obtain a partial refund
of the finance charge. (4) You may rescind this contract, subject to
liability for any liquidated damage provision thereof authorized by law,
not later than five P.M. on the business day following the date thereof
by giving written notice of rescission to the contractor at his place of
business given in the contract. . . . (Emphasis added.) 36
These mandatory terms, particularly the right to rescind, offer the buyer
ample protection against hasty and inconsiderate engagements induced by
a clever salesman which, upon deeper reflection, would prove unwise. The
one day "cooling off" period allows this time for reflection for ".... people
who are persuaded by persons whom they do not know to enter into con-
tracts that they do not understand to purchase goods that they do not
want with money that they have not got."'8 7
Among the prohibited terms are provisions by which the buyer waives
defenses he might have against either the contractor or assignee, or allows
the holder to arbitrarily and without reasonable cause accelerate maturity,
or waives any tort claim arising out of collection efforts; or which entitle
the seller to liquidated damages in excess of ten percent of the cash price
in the event of rescission.
8
The purpose behind the mandatory and the prohibited terms is appar-
ent. In a case involving a similar statute enacted in Maryland, the court
said: "It reflects the view that improvident and careless consumers who
buy on the installment plan need legal protection, since buyers ordinarily
do not read their contracts and associated papers carefully." 39 However,
Maryland is also sympathetic to the financer. In an action by the assignee
of an installment sale contract in which the defense was raised by the buyer
that his copy of the contract was not completely filled in since there was
no signature by the authorized agent of the corporate seller, the court found
for the assignee on the basis that the buyer, after executing an acknowledg-
ment of receipt of a proper copy of a contract, would be estopped to deny
it, saying: "It cannot be supposed that the legislature intended an applica-
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 500-202, 203 (Supp. 1964). See Appendix in which a
home improvement installment contract currently in use in the Philadelphia area
is reproduced.
37. Anonymous judge cited in Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Installment Sales
Legislation, 44 CORN.ZL L.Q. 38 (1958).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-206 (Supp. 1964).
39. United States v. Bland, 159 F. Supp. 395, 396 (D. Md. 1958).
[VOL. 10
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tion of the exception which would seriously hinder the free assignability of
retail installment agreements and thus drastically curtail the quantity of
installment credit sales."40
C. Negotiable Notes Prohibited
Perhaps the most important provisions of the Home Improvement
Finance Act are those relating to the use of a promissory note in connection
with the financing arrangement. 41 The statute, although permitting the use
of a promissory note, prohibits the use of a negotiable note by making
payment subject to the terms of the contract 42 and also by permitting the
power to confess judgment against the maker at any time, even before
default, 43 thus destroying the holder in due course position formerly
assumed by the financing agency in these situations. Failure to include
the required information upon the instruments used should result in their
being unenforceable in the hands of an assignee for value. Stronger pen-
alties are provided by the statute itself in the form of criminal sanctions
for willful violation of its terms, 44 and civil actions brought by the Attorney
General or local district attorney to enjoin violation.
45
D. Notice of Assignment and Buyer's Defenses
In order to aleviate the drastic curtailment of the use of negotiable
notes in conjunction with home improvement financing, the legislature pro-
vided the financer with a method of obtaining an insulated status as a holder
of the instrument free from defenses. This is achieved in the following
40. Associated Acceptance Corp. v. Bailey, 226 Md. 550, 556, 174 A.2d. 440,
444 (1961).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-207 (Supp. 1964) provides:
(a) No home improvement installment contract shall require or entail the
execution of any note or series of notes by the buyer which, when
separately negotiated, will cut off as to third parties any right of
action or defense which the buyer may have against the contractor.
(b) The contract may require or entail the execution of a promissory note
but only if it bears on the same side of the note as contains the
maker's signature, the following legend in at least ten point bold
type: "Payment of this note is subject to the terms of a home im-
provement installment contract of even date between maker and
payee." [See appendix.] No such note may be negotiated or other-
wise transferred without simultaneous delivery of the related contract.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-406 (Supp. 1964), provides that the note given in con-
junction with the improvement contract may contain a power of attorney to confess
judgment which may be exercised by the holder before default.
42. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-105(2): ". . . A promise or order is not un-
conditional [required for negotiability by § 3-104(1-b)] if the instrument (a) states
that it is subject to or governed by any other agreement ....
43. It has been held that section 3-104(1)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code
which provides that an instrument to be negotiable must contain an unconditional
promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no other promise, order, obliga-
tion or power except as is authorized by the code mitigates against negotiability when
the power to confess judgment may be exercised at any time instead of being limited
to events of default as permitted by section 3-112(1) (d). Atlas Credit Corp. v.
Leonard, 15 Pa. D.&C.2d 292 (C.P. Lancaster County 1957), discussed briefly in Del
Duca, Commercial Code Litigation, 66 DICK. L. REv. 39, 40 (1961).
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-501 (Supp. 1964).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-502 (Supp. 1964).
COMMENTS
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manner: upon acquiring the note and contract, the assignee must give
notice of the assignment to the buyer and this notice, in addition to the
names and addresses of the parties involved, the subject matter of the con-
tract, the number and amount of installments in which the time balance is
payable and the due dates must contain the following legend in at least
eight point bold type:
Notice:
1. If the within statement of your transaction with the contractor
is not correct in every respect; or
2. If the goods and services described in or in an enclosure with
this notice have not been delivered and satisfactorily performed by the
contractor; or
3. If the contractor has not fully performed all his agreements
with you, you must notify the assiqnee in writing at the address indi-
cated in or in an enclosure with this notice within fifteen days from
the date of the mailing of this notice; otherwise, you will have no right
to assert against the assignee any right of action or defense arising
out of the sale which you might otherwise have against the contractor.
46
(Emphasis added.)
Presumably, the statutory language which requires that the contract be
fully performed will guard against the possibility of a contractor doing a
workmanlike but incomplete job and then, after fifteen days, obtaining the
contract price and absconding. This provision imposes the duty of inquiry
upon the financer to see that the underlying contract has been completely
and satisfactorily performed, a duty which has been termed an almost
insurmountable burden on the free flow of commercial paper.47 It is diffi-
cult' to see how the insertion of the required notice into an envelope, to-
gether with the other papers, coupon book, etc. which would be directed to
the consumer anyway, would impose a burden upon the financing agency.
However, due to the magnitude of the operations of some financial institu-
tions, some problems could develop when a contract is unsatisfactorily per-
formed and notice to that effect returned by the customer within fifteen
days. If the notice is misdirected, payment to the dealer may already have
been made or a protective judgment entered against the makers. Even if
this had not happened, a bank employee would have to investigate the
complaint, which may often prove to be groundless, and, if legitimate, see
that corrective measures are taken. This would seem to place the financer
in the middle of the home improvement business.
On the other hand, it is quite possible that the consumer will either
fail to read the notice of assignment and statement of his rights or will
"file" it away for future reference.
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-208 (Supp. 1964). New York only allows the
buyer ten days within which to give notice. N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 403(3)
(McKinney 1962).
47. Atlas Credit Corp. v. Breslin, 58 Sch. L.R. 104 (C.P. Schuylkill County 1959)
First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 7 Pa. D.&C.2d 661 (C.P. Bucks County 1955).
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After taking the assignment, the financing agency may select one of
three alternatives regarding the availability of the proceeds of discount to
the contractor. One would be to pay over the entire proceeds to the con-
tractor immediately upon discount, with the understanding that the con-
tractor will take remedial steps or repurchase the contract in the event a
notice of claim is received from the buyer within fifteen days. This could
be done when the relationship between financer and contractor has been
long and favorable. A second alternative, more likely to be employed when
first dealing with a new contractor, would be to hold back any payment
until the fifteen day notice period has passed without incident. A final
possibility would be to retain a percentage of the discount proceeds until
after the fifteen day period, thus advancing enough to the contractor to
pay his costs while retaining part of the proceeds as a reserve to cover the
costs of remedying any possible defects.
48
As far as the financer is concerned, assuming that the fifteen day notice
period elapses with no claims made by the customer, it should be in a
stronger position than under prior practices when the courts were able to
justify decisions for the consumer. Although the financer can no longer be
a holder in due course, he should be insulated from defenses by the buyer
on the theory of estoppel. 49 Consequently, by failing to raise a defense
within the fifteen day notice period, the buyer should be compelled to for-
ever hold his peace. This should provide a clean cut fact situation in the
event of litigation under the statute.50
E. Miscellaneous Provisions
In addition to the substantial changes in the law of home improvement
sales financing effected by the previously discussed provisions, the legisla-
ture has provided several other protections to prevent the consumer from
being bilked by the unscrupulous salesman. First of all, the maximum
finance charge on a home improvement installment contract may not exceed
eight dollars per one hundred dollars per year 5' where previously there
was no regulation other than usury laws so that finance charges amounted
to whatever the traffic would bear.
48. Address by Anthony G. Felix, Jr., Esquire, Senior Vice-President and Secre-
tary of The First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Company, before Pennsylvania
Bankers Association, Nov. 21, 1963.
One Philadelphia bank forwards payment to their established dealers immediately,
while waiting for the fifteen day notice period to elapse before paying new accounts.
Interview, supra note 31.
49. ". . . estoppel is a bar which precludes a person from denying or asserting
anything to the contrary of that which has, in contemplation of law, been established
as the truth, . . . by hfs own deed or representations, either express or implied."
19 Am. JUR. ESTOPPEL § 2 (1939).
50. See generally Legislative Regulation of Retail Installment Financing, 7
U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 623, 752-54 (1960).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-301 (Supp. 1964). Compare N.Y. PERSONAL
PROPERTY LAW, § 404(1-a) (McKinney 1962), ten dollars per hundred dollars per
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A more significant protection of the consumer from his folly is the
prohibition of buyer rewards in excess of the value of two dollars and fifty
centS5 2 as well as an unequivocal renunciation of the ever-popular referral
plan5 3 through which consumers were promised rewards or discounts for
inducing others to enter a similar plan or contract thus becoming, in reality,
an integral part of the contractor's sales force. The object was to prevent
such situations as:
The referral plan was a fraudulent scheme based on an operation
similar to the recurrent chain letter racket. It is one of many sales
rackets being carried on throughout the nation which are giving public
officials serious concern. The plaintiffs introduced evidence to show
that at the end of 20 months of operation, it would require 17 trillion
salesmen to carry on a referral program like World Wide described
to the plaintiffs.
5 4
This section of the statute is indeed one of the most beneficial since it
provides a strong deterrent against one of the most lowly rackets practiced
by the "suede-shoe" operator, a glib-tongued pitchman who is here today
and gone tomorrow, leaving just after he has discounted the note with a
finance company.
Finally, one regulation, aimed at tightening up the enforcement of the
act, would have required licensing of both contractors and financing
agencies, which license would have been revoked for willful failure to comply
with the procedures of the act or even for demonstration of lack of financial
responsibility.5 5 This failed to gain legislative approval, however, and the




In general, it may be said that two disadvantages may result from
this type of installment sales regulation. The first is the retardation of
installment selling. The second is that the practical effects intended by
the drafters will be thwarted by unscrupulous individuals who have a
talent for evasion of the law.57 Statistics have indicated that, among fraud-
ulent contractors and salesmen, the offenders were few but repeated.58
At this time, there have been no reported cases decided under the
Home Improvement Act. The National Established Repair, Service, Im-
provement Contractors Association (NERSICA) was planning to chal-
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-404(c) (Supp. 1964).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-404(a) (Supp. 1964).
54. Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 57, 195 A.2d 115,117 (1963).51. The New Jersey statute has such a licensing requirement. N.J. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, §§ 17:16C-77-17:16C-84 (1963).
5.6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 500-501, 502 (Supp. 1964).
57. See generally Hogan, supra note 37.
58. 41 Chi. B. Record 285 (1959).
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lenge the law as "ambiguous and discriminatory", claiming that there was
only a small percentage of contractors who were to blame for defective
work and that the law would lead to a rash of unjustified complaints and
cancellation, but to date no action has been commenced. 59
In theory, the Pennsylvania Home Improvement Finance Act is a
great improvement itself over the previous situation. One drafter has
stated that the consumer has gained a great deal of protection from the
opportunity for rescission, the uniformity of finance charge rates, and the
opportunity to have defective work corrected.60 Admittedly, this is so.
Also, in theory, financing agencies occupy a stronger position (after the
fifteen day notice period has expired) than they did previously when they
were more or less at the "equitable" mercy of a judge. Compliance with
the statutory provisions is final and conclusive proof of the financer's in-
sulated position as an assignee for value, free of all defenses.
At this time, after almost one year's experience under the Home
Improvement Act, only about one per cent of the contracts assigned to one
Philadelphia bank have been repurchased by the dealer. 6' The number of
groundless complaints from meticulous customers who recognize a good
thing when they see it are not known. It is submitted that the Act is
overly protective of the consumer at the expense of the financer who now
has the burden of policing the performance of the contract. This theory
is unsupported at present and only time and judicial interpretation will
determine whether, in an attempt to provide protection where it was sorely
needed, the legislature tipped the scales too far to the detriment of the
financer.
Edward Gerald Donnelly, Jr.
59. Newman, Who's to Blame in Home Frauds?, The Evening Bulletin, Oct. 24,
1963, p. 34, col. 7.
60. Interview, supra note 31.
61. Ibid. This is the result of a selective policy in choosing certain dealers as
sources for home improvement paper.
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HOME IMPROVEMENT INSTALLMENT CONTRACT
(ORIGINAL TO PENCO)
D ate ................... 19....
Contractor's Name and
Place of Business .............................
Name No.-Street ....... .. y tate
Buyer's Name and
Address ..................................... ..... .....
Name No.-Street.fty.County StateCo-Buyer's Name and
Address.......................................................
Name No.-Street........ ity Co~unty.State
Contractor agrees to sell and Buyer (which means Buyer and all Co-Buyers who sign
below, jointly and severally) agrees to buy the following goods and services, which are to
be furnished or used in the modernization, rehabilitation, repair, alteration or Improvement
of the real property located at Buyer's address given above or at ......................
No.-Street City County State
Description of Goods and Services
for a time sale price computed as follows :
1. Cash Price of the goods and services (including taxes) - - -
2. Down Payment:
Cash . . . . . . . . . . . . ..----- - - - - - - $ ...........
Trade-in (Describe) ..... .......... $ ...........
Allowances (Describe)................ $ ...........
3. Unpaid Cash Balance (Difference between Items 1 and 2) - -
4. Group Credit Life Insurance to be procured by Contractor.
(..)Yes (..) No
If "yes" see Notice of Proposed Group Credit Life Insur-
ance on reverse side hereof.
If "yes" and a separate charge is to be made therefore the
charge is ---------------------------------
5. Other types of insurance (describe coverage, term and cost of each)
6. Official Fees .....-.........---------








8. Finance Charge ................. $ ............
9. T im e B alance (Sum of Item s 7 and 8) . . . . . . . . . $ ........
10. Time Sale Price (Sum of Items 2 and 9) - - - $ ...........
Buyer agrees to pay the Time Balance: (a)
in ........... successive monthly installments (If any installment substantially ex-
of $ ............ each or (b) in accordance with ceeds in amount any prior install-
the Payment Schedule on the back of this Con- ment complete the following:)
tract if the Time Balance is payable in other
than successive monthly installments. The first THIS CONTRACT IS NOT PAY-
installment is payable on .................... .ABLE IN INSTALLMENTS OF
19 .... or if no date is specified, on a date EQUAL AMOUNTS; AN INSTALL-
(notice of which shall be given to Buyer) not MENT OF $ .............. WILL BE
later than 120 days following the date Contrac- DUE ON .................. 19....
tor has furnished the goods and services covered
hereby, and the remaining installments are pay- (or if there be more than one larger
able on the same day of the month as the first installment)
installment. All such installment payments shall
be paid promptly on their respective due dates LARGER INSTALLMENTS WILL
(time being of the essence) at any office of TuE BE DUE AS FOLLOWS:
FIRST PENNSYLVANIA BANKING AND TRUST COuI- (insert amount and due date of each)
I'ANY or such other place as the holder hereof
('Holder" as used in this Contract means the Contractor or anyone claiming under or
through the Contractor and currently entitled to his rights) may designate. Upon the
failure of Buyer to make any installment payment when and where due, or upon occurrence
of any other event of default, the Holder, at its option, may declare the entire amount
remaining unpaid hereunder to be immediately due and payable.
If prior to the time the Contractor starts performance of this Contract Buyer fails
or refuses to accept delivery of the goods or performance of the services covered hereby,
Buyer agrees to pay to Contractor as liquidated damages an amount equal to ten percent
(10%) of the Cash Price stated herein. This contract, subject to liability for any liqui-
dated damage provision thereof authorized by law, may be rescinded by the Buyer not
later than five p.m. on the business day following the date thereof by giving written
notice of rescission to the Contractor at his place of business given in this contract, but
if Buyer rescinds after five p.m. on the business day following. Buyer is still entitled to offer
defenses in mitigation of damages and to pursue any rights of action or defenses that arise
out of the transaction.
Any right of action or defense arising out of the transaction which gave rise to this
Contract which Buyer has against Contractor shall be cut off by assignment of this Con-
tract to any third person if the assignee gives notice of the assignment to Buyer as
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provided in Section 208 of the Home Improvement Finance Act (Pennsylvania) and with-
in fifteen days of the mailing of such notice receives no written notice of the facts giving
rise to the claim or defense of the Buyer.
Each Buyer and Co-Buyer, jointly and severally, hereby authorizes and empowers the
Protionotary, Clerk or any attorney, of any court of record within the United States or
elsewhere, at any time, to appear for each Buyer and/or Co-Buyer and to confess judg-
ment as often as necessary against each Buyer and/or Co-Buyer and in favor of the Holder,
as of any term, with or without declaration filed for such sum or sums as may be pay-
able hereunder with costs of suit and with 20% added as attorney's fees. With respect to
any judgment entered hereon, each Buyer and Co-Buyer releases all errors and waives all
rights of appeal, appraisement, stay of execution, inquisition and exemption under any
law now or hereafter in force, and each hereby agrees that real estate may be sold under
a writ of execution and voluntarily condemns the same and authorizes the Prothonotary
or Clerk to enter said condemnation on such writ; and each Buyer and Co-Buyer agreesthat a true copy hereof, verified by affidavit made by the Holder or someone acting on Its
behalf, may be filed in such proceeding in lieu of filing the original as warrant of attorney,
any rule of court, custom or practice to the contrary notwithstanding.
This contract is subject to the additional provisions including the Notice of Proposed
Group Credit Life Insurance, set forth on the reverse side hereof, the same being incor-
porated herein by reference.
Notice to Buyer: (1) Do not sign this contract before you read It. (2) You are entitled
to a completely filled-in copy of this contract. (3) Under the law you have the right topay off in advance the full amount due and under certain conditions to obtain a partial
refund of the finance charge. (4) You may rescind this contract subject to liability for any
liquidated damage provision thereof authorized by law not later than five p.m. on the
business day following the date hereof. by giving written notice of rescission to the con-
tractor at his place of business given in the contract, but if you rescind after five p.m. onthe business day following you are still entitled to offer defenses in mitigation of damages
and to pursue any rights of action or defenses that arise out of the transaction.
Contractor's signature set forth below In Witness Whereof, the parties hereto
shall also operate as Contractor's execu- have signed this contract the above date.
tion of the Contractor's Assignment on
the reverse side hereof.
............................... (L.S.) .......-------- (L.S.)
Contractor Buyer (Person to be covered by Group
Credit Life Insurance if any)
By .......-------------------------------...............------..-......... (L.S.)
Signature and Title Co-Buyer
-- -----------------------------------------------------
$ .......................................................------- 19 ....(Total of Note) (City) (County) (State) (Date)
Undersigned, jointly and severally if more than one, promise to pay to the order
of .....................................................
(Name of Contractor)
-------------------... Dollars(a) in - successive monthly installments of $............ each and a final monthly
installment of $ ............ ,the first installment to be payable on the .......... day
of .................... ,19.... , and the remaining installments to be paid on a like day
of each succeeding month thereafter; or (b) in accordance with the payment schedule on
the reverse side hereof. Said installments to be made at any office of THe FIRST PENN-SYLVANIA BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY, or such other place as the holder hereof may
designate, with interest after default at the highest lawful rate. In case of the failure of
the undersigned to pay any installment hereunder when and where due, the holder herof,
at his option may declare the entire amount of this note then remaining unpaid, immedi-
ately due and payable, and proceed to collect the same.
Undersigned agrees to pay a delinquency and collection charge for each default in pay-ment which continues for a period of ten (10) days or more in an amount equal to 5%
of the amount of the installment In default or $5.00 whichever is less. If the holder hereof
refers this note to an attorney (not a salaried employee of such holder) for collection,
undersigned agree to pay as attorney's fees a sum equal to 20% of the amount due and
payable under this note pils court costs actually incurred.
As security for the payment of this note undersigned, jointly and severally, hereby
authorize and empower the Prothonotary. Clerk or any attorney, of any court of record
within the United States or elsewhere, at any time, to appear for them or any of themand to confess judgment against them or any of them in favor of the holder hereof, as of
any term, with or without declaration filed for the total amount of this note and withcosts of suit and with 20% added as attorney's fees. With respect to any judgment entered
hereon, each of the undersigned releases all errors and waives all rights of appeal, appraise-
ment, stay of execution, inquisition and exemption under any law now or hereafter in force,and each hereby agrees that real estate may be sold under a writ of execution and volun-
tarily condemns the same and authorizes the Prothonotary or Clerk to enter said condemna-
tion on such writ. Each of the undersigned and all endorsers waive protest of this note,
notice of protest, or notice of dishonor of any kind.
Payment of this note is subject to the terms of a home improvement
installment contract of even date between maker and payee.
.............. '(Ad'd'ress) .............. .............. (Signa ure). (Seal)
............... (.ignaure) (Seal).... ... . Address) . . .. . . .
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